The Scam Epidemic: How Social Media Fraud Is Targeting Algerian Citizens

Algeria’s Social Media Paradox: Connected but Unprotected

Algeria has undergone a quiet digital revolution. With internet penetration reaching 76.9% at the start of 2025 and over 33 million Facebook users as of March 2025, the country ranks among the most socially connected in Africa. Platforms like Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and Telegram have become the de facto digital infrastructure for commerce, communication, and community. Yet this connectivity has created a massive, largely undefended attack surface for fraud operators who have identified Algerian users as high-value, low-resistance targets.

The scale of the problem is alarming. Algeria’s cybercrime caseload has been rising sharply for years: the DGSN recorded 5,163 cybercrime incidents in 2020, up from 4,210 in 2019, and the trend has only accelerated as social media adoption has surged. Combining DGSN and National Gendarmerie figures, nearly 8,000 cybercrime offences were recorded in 2020 alone. Experts estimate the true number of victims is five to ten times higher than official figures, as cultural stigma, distrust of authorities, and lack of awareness prevent most victims from reporting. With individual losses ranging from a few thousand dinars for fake marketplace purchases to tens of millions for elaborate business email compromise schemes, the cumulative financial toll on Algerian households is substantial and growing.

What makes Algeria particularly vulnerable is a specific combination of factors: a young, digitally active population with limited cybersecurity literacy; a booming informal e-commerce sector conducted almost entirely through Facebook pages and WhatsApp groups; and content that flows in French, Arabic, and Darija, creating linguistic complexity that defeats most automated platform moderation tools.

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Anatomy of the Most Common Scams

The fake job offer has become one of the most prevalent scams targeting Algerian citizens. Group-IB researchers identified more than 1,500 fraudulent job ads across the MENA region in 2025, with Algeria ranked among the most targeted countries alongside Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. Fraudsters create polished Facebook pages impersonating major employers like Sonatrach, Cevital, Djezzy, or Ooredoo, posting job listings that mirror legitimate openings. Applicants are directed to convincing portals where they submit national ID numbers, bank details, and sometimes pay “processing fees” of 5,000 to 15,000 DZD. ANEM (Agence Nationale de l’Emploi) has warned repeatedly about fraudulent job schemes using its branding, yet the pages continue to proliferate faster than they can be reported.

E-commerce fraud represents the second major vector. Algeria’s formal e-commerce market is projected at $1.5 billion in 2025 according to Statista, but a significant volume of transactions flows through informal social commerce channels — Facebook pages and Instagram accounts with payment via CCP (postal account) transfer or BaridiMob. Scammers create pages offering electronics, clothing, or household goods at prices 30-50% below market value. After receiving CCP transfers, they block buyers and disappear. Algeria’s consumer protection body APOCE, in collaboration with Algérie Poste, has issued public warnings about recurring fraud attempts targeting BaridiMob and Edahabia card users, urging citizens never to share secret codes or click suspicious links. The CCP system’s near-instant transfer capability and the difficulty of reversing transactions make recovery virtually impossible.

Romance scams and sextortion represent a growing but underreported category. Targeting both men and women, these schemes typically begin on Facebook or Instagram with attractive profile photos stolen from international accounts. After building emotional rapport over weeks, scammers either request money transfers via CCP or BaridiMob, or escalate to sextortion by soliciting intimate images and then demanding payment to prevent their distribution. The 18-35 demographic is particularly targeted, with male victims of sextortion showing the lowest reporting rates due to shame and social stigma.

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Why Platform Moderation Fails in Algeria

Meta’s content moderation infrastructure was not built for Algeria’s linguistic reality. Algerian social media operates in a fluid mix of Modern Standard Arabic, French, Darija (Algerian Arabic written in Latin or Arabic script), and increasingly, “Arabizi” (Arabic transliterated into Latin characters with numbers). A scam post might use French for the headline, Darija for the body text, and Arabic script for the contact details. Research from the Center for Democracy and Technology has documented how Maghrebi Arabic is a “low-resource language” for content moderation, meaning there is far less high-quality training data available to build effective classifiers. Models trained on Modern Standard Arabic perform poorly when applied to regional North African dialects, and language identification tools often fail to differentiate between Arabic, Darija, and code-switched content.

The Internet Society Foundation’s 2025 research on content moderation in the Maghreb confirms that Maghrebi Arabic users frequently encounter both over-moderation of legitimate content and under-moderation of harmful content, including fraud. The Middle East Institute has further documented how linguistic challenges and resource gaps undermine moderation efforts across the MENA region. When Algerian users do report scam pages, platform response times often allow well-organized fraud operations to victimize hundreds of people and simply migrate to a new page before action is taken.

Government impersonation adds another dangerous layer. Fraudsters create pages mimicking official government services, including fake portals for passport renewals, housing applications (AADL/LPP programs), and national ID card requests. In December 2025, Algérie Poste specifically warned the public about suspicious communications targeting beneficiaries of the AADL 3 housing program regarding payment of the first installment. These scams exploit Algerians’ experience with opaque bureaucratic processes, making it plausible that a government service might request personal details or small fees through social media. The Ministry of Post and Telecommunications has launched awareness campaigns for safe use of the Edahabia card and BaridiMob, but awareness of which pages are genuine remains low among the general population.

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A Practical Defense Guide for Algerian Citizens

Individual protection starts with verification discipline. Before engaging with any commercial or employment offer on social media, citizens should cross-reference through official channels. Legitimate employers post openings on ANEM’s official portal (anem.dz), their own corporate websites, and verified LinkedIn pages. No legitimate Algerian employer requests fees for job applications. For e-commerce, the rule is simple: if a deal requires CCP transfer to an individual rather than a registered business account, and the price seems too good, it is almost certainly fraud.

Technical hygiene provides the second layer of defense. Enable two-factor authentication on every social media account using an authenticator app rather than SMS, as SIM-swapping is a growing global threat that affects mobile networks everywhere, including Algeria’s operators. Use unique passwords for each platform; a password manager like Bitwarden (free tier) eliminates the excuse that strong passwords are too difficult to manage. Review Facebook’s “Apps and Websites” settings quarterly to revoke access from forgotten third-party applications that could serve as entry points for account takeover.

At the systemic level, Algeria needs a coordinated response. The government’s updated National Digital Strategy, which prioritizes cybersecurity across more than 500 digital projects planned for 2025-2026, is a step in the right direction. The Information Systems Security Agency’s April 2025 initiative to bring cybersecurity awareness into elementary schools signals growing recognition of the problem. Schools should integrate digital literacy into curricula starting at the middle school level. Banks and Algérie Poste should implement transaction delay mechanisms for CCP transfers above certain thresholds to new recipients, creating a friction-based defense against impulse-driven scam payments. APOCE and consumer rights organizations should establish standardized scam reporting portals that aggregate data and enable pattern detection across wilaya boundaries.

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The Road Ahead: Regulation and Resilience

Algeria’s legal framework is slowly adapting. Law 09-04, enacted in August 2009, provides the foundation for combating cybercrime with penalties ranging from three months to three years of imprisonment and fines of DZD 50,000 to 5 million, with penalties doubled when offences target national defense or public institutions. The government has continued updating cybercrime legislation, but prosecution rates for social media fraud remain low. Cross-border jurisdiction compounds the problem, as many scam operations targeting Algerian users are run from neighboring countries or international fraud networks. INTERPOL’s Operation Red Card 2.0, conducted across 16 African nations from December 2025 to January 2026, resulted in 651 arrests and the recovery of more than $4.3 million, underscoring the transnational scale of the problem.

The private sector has a role to play as well. Algerian banks and fintech companies like Slickpay and Chargily should invest in transaction monitoring that flags patterns consistent with fraud, such as multiple small incoming transfers from different accounts followed by rapid withdrawal. Algérie Poste, which operates BaridiMob and BaridiWeb, should strengthen its fraud detection capabilities given that CCP transfers are the primary payment rail for social commerce. Telecoms operators can contribute by implementing caller ID verification and SMS sender authentication to reduce phishing via text message, which often serves as the initial hook driving victims to fraudulent social media pages.

Ultimately, the scam epidemic is a side effect of Algeria’s digital transformation proceeding faster than its digital defense capabilities. The country’s young, connected population is an enormous asset, but without matching investments in cybersecurity literacy and consumer protection infrastructure, that connectivity becomes vulnerability.

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Sources & Further Reading

• DataReportal — Digital 2025: Algeria
• NapoleonCat — Facebook Users in Algeria, March 2025
• Group-IB — Online Job Scams Targeting MENA Region (2025)
• Infosecurity Magazine — Coordinated Scams Target MENA With Fake Job Ads
• Center for Democracy and Technology — Moderating Maghrebi Arabic Content on Social Media
• Internet Society Foundation — Content Moderation in the Global South: Maghreb Region (2025)
• Middle East Institute — Content Moderation Trends in the MENA Region
• WIPO — Algeria Law No. 09-04 on Cybercrime (2009)
• CMS Expert Guide — Data Protection and Cybersecurity Laws in Algeria
• INTERPOL — Operation Red Card 2.0 (February 2026)
• Statista — eCommerce Market Forecast: Algeria
• Algérie Poste / APOCE — BaridiMob Scam Warning
• Ministry of Post and Telecommunications — BaridiMob/Edahabia Awareness Campaign
• DZWatch — Algeria Post Warns of AADL 3 Payment Scams
• Startup3lmashi — Algeria Unveils Sovereign Cybersecurity Strategy