Algeria’s Cybercrime Legal Framework: From Penal Code to Digital Evidence in Court

The Legal Architecture: Law 09-04 and the Penal Code

Algeria’s cybercrime legal framework rests on two primary pillars: Law 09-04 of August 5, 2009, on the specific rules for the prevention and combating of offenses related to information and communication technologies, and the Penal Code’s dedicated cyber provisions introduced through Law 04-15 of November 10, 2004. Together, they form one of the more comprehensive cybercrime legal frameworks in North Africa — at least on paper.

Law 09-04 established the foundational architecture for cybercrime response. It created the legal basis for electronic surveillance of suspected cybercriminals (with judicial authorization), mandated data retention by internet service providers for a minimum period, enabled international cooperation on cybercrime investigations, and defined the institutional framework for Algeria’s national response. The law was subsequently strengthened by Law 16-02 of June 19, 2016, which further defined cyber offenses and established a national committee for preventing and fighting ICT-related crimes (ONPLCITIC). Critically, these laws also established the obligation for ISPs and hosting providers to cooperate with law enforcement and preserve digital evidence upon judicial request — a provision that has become increasingly important as Algeria’s internet penetration reached approximately 77% at the start of 2025, with 36.2 million users online according to DataReportal.

The Penal Code’s cyber-specific provisions, Articles 394bis and following (introduced by Law 04-15 in 2004 and expanded by Law 16-02 in 2016), criminalize the core offenses: unauthorized access to information systems (394bis), remaining in a system after accidental access (394ter), and introducing or modifying data fraudulently (394quater). Penalties for unauthorized access in its simple form range from three months to one year imprisonment and fines from 50,000 to 100,000 DZD. For deliberate assaults on data, penalties increase to six months to three years imprisonment and fines from 500,000 to 2,000,000 DZD. Aggravating circumstances — targeting national defense systems or critical infrastructure — can double sentences. Provisions added by Law 16-02 carry fines up to 10,000,000 DZD. The provisions addressing the creation, possession, or distribution of hacking tools have drawn criticism from the cybersecurity research community for their potential chilling effect on legitimate security research.

Digital Evidence: Collection, Chain of Custody, and Court Admissibility

When a cybercrime occurs in Algeria, the evidentiary chain begins with the specialized units of either the Direction Generale de la Surete Nationale (DGSN — national police) or the Gendarmerie Nationale. Both maintain dedicated cybercrime investigation units: the DGSN’s Service Central de Lutte Contre la Cybercriminalite (SCLCC), which inaugurated expanded headquarters in Algiers in October 2023, and the Gendarmerie’s National Institute of Forensic Evidence and Crime Sciences (INCC), which includes a dedicated Information Technology and Electronics section. These units handle evidence collection, initial forensic analysis, and case preparation for prosecution.

Digital evidence admissibility in Algerian courts is governed by the general evidentiary framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure, supplemented by Law 09-04’s specific provisions. Algerian law follows the principle of free evaluation of evidence (intime conviction) — judges assess the probative value of digital evidence based on its authenticity, integrity, and reliability. However, the practical challenge is significant: digital evidence must be collected following procedures that preserve the chain of custody, and the forensic methodology must be defensible under cross-examination. Algeria has not yet adopted formal digital forensics standards equivalent to ISO 27037 (Guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition, and preservation of digital evidence) at the national level, though individual units increasingly reference international standards.

The gap between legal provisions and forensic capacity is real. Extracting evidence from encrypted devices, cloud-hosted services (often on servers outside Algerian jurisdiction), and ephemeral messaging platforms requires both technical tooling and international cooperation. The SCLCC has invested in forensic workstations and tools, but the volume of cybercrime cases is growing faster than forensic capacity. The DGSN recorded approximately 500 cybercrime cases in 2015 and 5,200 in 2020 — a tenfold increase in five years — while the Gendarmerie separately recorded 1,362 cybercrime offences in 2020 alone. More recent disaggregated figures are not publicly available, but INTERPOL’s 2025 Africa Cyberthreat Assessment identified Algeria among the top targets for cyber attacks in the region, and Kaspersky detected over 70 million blocked cyber-attack attempts targeting Algeria in 2024.

Prosecution and Judicial Capacity

The prosecution of cybercrime in Algeria reveals a structural bottleneck: the gap between law enforcement’s ability to investigate and the judiciary’s capacity to adjudicate technically complex cases. Algerian prosecutors and judges receive limited specialized training in digital evidence interpretation, and the country does not yet have dedicated cybercrime courts or chambers. The Council of Europe’s CyberSouth programme has supported training-of-trainers modules in Algeria to build pools of national trainers, and the Ministry of Justice co-organized a national conference on cybercrime with the Council of Europe in September 2023 — but these capacity-building efforts are still maturing.

Conviction rates for cybercrime in Algeria are difficult to obtain with precision, as the Ministry of Justice does not publish disaggregated cybercrime statistics. However, judicial sources indicate that the majority of prosecuted cybercrime cases involve relatively straightforward offenses: online defamation and harassment (prosecuted under both the Penal Code and the April 2020 penal code amendments criminalizing the spread of false information), fraud and financial scams, and unauthorized access to social media accounts. Data from the Gendarmerie shows that defamation and insult via digital platforms account for over 55% of recorded cybercrime, followed by crimes against public security and violations of privacy. Complex cases involving corporate data theft, advanced persistent threats, or infrastructure attacks rarely reach prosecution — either because attribution is technically difficult, the perpetrators are outside Algerian jurisdiction, or the forensic evidence does not meet the evidentiary threshold.

International cooperation adds another layer of complexity. Algeria has not ratified the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention), which entered into force in June 2023, and has not acceded to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime — the primary international treaty facilitating cross-border cybercrime cooperation. This limits Algeria’s access to the 24/7 network for rapid mutual legal assistance that Budapest Convention parties enjoy. Notably, Algeria chairs the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime, which has been negotiating a separate UN convention on cybercrime — signaling engagement at the multilateral level even while bilateral cooperation mechanisms remain limited. When cybercriminals operate from outside Algeria or use infrastructure hosted in foreign jurisdictions (which is nearly always the case for sophisticated attacks), the lack of streamlined international cooperation mechanisms significantly hampers investigation and prosecution.

Reform Priorities and the Path Forward

Algeria’s cybercrime legal framework is not deficient in statutory coverage — the criminal provisions are broadly adequate and comparable to regional peers. The gaps are institutional and procedural. Four reform priorities stand out as most impactful for strengthening the complete legal chain from incident to conviction.

First, digital forensics standardization. Adopting ISO 27037 and ISO 27042 as the national reference standards for digital evidence handling would strengthen the evidentiary chain and reduce challenges to evidence admissibility. The Algerian Institute of Standardization (IANOR) could develop Algerian national standards (NA) aligned with these international frameworks, as it has done for other technical domains. Algeria’s National Information Security Repository (published in 2020 and aligned with GDPR, NIST 800-53, and ISO/IEC 27002) provides a foundation, but dedicated digital forensics standards remain absent. Second, judicial specialization. Establishing dedicated cybercrime chambers within the courts of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine — the three largest judicial districts — would concentrate technical expertise and improve adjudication quality. Morocco’s cybersecurity framework, anchored by Law 05-20 on Cybersecurity (2020) and supported by 29 specialized cybercrime investigation units, provides a useful regional benchmark for institutional investment.

Third, Budapest Convention accession. Joining the Budapest Convention would grant Algeria access to the most effective international mechanism for cross-border cybercrime cooperation, including expedited preservation requests and mutual legal assistance. Tunisia acceded in March 2024, becoming the 70th party, and Morocco has been a party since 2018 — Algeria’s absence from this framework increasingly isolates its cybercrime response from the international cooperation network. Fourth, protective provisions for security researchers. Amending the Penal Code’s provisions on hacking tools to include explicit safe harbor provisions for good-faith security research would align Algeria with the growing international consensus (reflected in the U.S. DOJ’s 2022 CFAA prosecution guidelines and the EU’s NIS2 Directive, which encourages member states to adopt non-prosecution guidelines for security researchers) that vulnerability research conducted in good faith should not face criminal liability.

Sources & Further Reading

• Law 09-04 of August 5, 2009 — Prevention and Combating of ICT Offenses — WIPO Lex
• Law 09-04 — Digital Watch Observatory
• Algeria Cybersecurity Profile — Council of Europe Octopus Community
• Budapest Convention on Cybercrime — Council of Europe
• Tunisia Becomes 70th Party to Budapest Convention — Council of Europe (March 2024)
• Morocco Ratifies Budapest Convention — Morocco World News
• African Union Malabo Convention — Ratification Status
• SCLCC New Headquarters Inaugurated — APS (October 2023)
• Algeria Cybersecurity and Governance — State of Software Engineering in Algeria
• Digital 2025: Algeria — DataReportal
• Algeria Criminalises Fake News (April 2020) — Al Jazeera
• INTERPOL Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2025
• ISO 27037: Guidelines for Digital Evidence Handling
• U.S. DOJ 2022 CFAA Prosecution Guidelines
• EU NIS2 Directive — Article 12 on Vulnerability Disclosure
• IANOR — Algerian Institute of Standardization