The world’s most important geopolitical competition of the 21st century is not being waged on battlefields or at sea. It is being waged in research laboratories, data centers, government corridors, and international standards bodies — and the outcome will determine who shapes the rules of AI for the next century.
In 2026, the global AI governance race has entered a new phase. The foundational question — “should AI be regulated?” — has been definitively answered: yes. The debate has shifted to “by whom, on what terms, and in whose interests?” And the answers being formulated in Washington, Beijing, Brussels, London, and New Delhi are not always aligned.
The Three Models of AI Governance
Three distinct approaches to AI governance have emerged as the dominant templates, each reflecting deeper values about the relationship between technology, government, economy, and society:
Model 1: The EU’s Precautionary Framework
Core logic: AI should be regulated proactively based on risk, with human rights and safety prioritized above innovation speed.
The EU AI Act (fully enforced from August 2026) is the world’s most comprehensive AI legislation. It bans certain AI uses outright, imposes strict requirements on high-risk applications, and establishes an enforcement infrastructure with real teeth — fines up to 7% of global annual revenue.
Strengths: Provides clear rules, builds public trust, protects fundamental rights
Weaknesses: Can slow deployment, create competitive disadvantage, stifle innovation at the frontier
Global influence: High — the “Brussels Effect” is real; multinational companies are implementing EU standards globally
Model 2: The US’s Competitiveness-First Approach
Core logic: AI leadership is a matter of national security and economic dominance; regulation should minimize friction for innovation.
Under the Trump administration’s January 2025 Executive Order “Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,” the US explicitly rejected the Biden-era AI Safety framework and replaced it with a competitiveness-centered approach. A December 2025 follow-up EO “Ensuring a National Policy Framework for AI” took direct aim at state-level AI regulations, seeking to preempt a patchwork of state laws.
The US AI Action Plan explicitly calls for countering China’s influence in international AI standards bodies.
Strengths: Preserves innovation speed, maintains US frontier model leadership
Weaknesses: Creates trust deficits, leaves safety questions unresolved, fragmented state-level situation
Global influence: Very high — US AI companies dominate global markets; what the US builds, the world adopts
Model 3: China’s State-Supervised Approach
Core logic: AI should serve national development goals, social stability, and the Communist Party’s priorities; governance is integrated with industrial policy.
China has enacted some of the world’s earliest AI-specific regulations: Algorithmic Recommendation Regulations (2022), Deep Synthesis (deepfakes) Regulations (2022), and Generative AI Regulations (2023). These focus heavily on content control, national security, and ensuring AI outputs “uphold socialist core values.”
On the international stage, China has proposed the creation of WAICO — the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization — a UN-adjacent body that would give China a central role in defining global AI norms.
In 2025, China’s government published a Global AI Governance Action Plan that positioned Chinese governance principles as a legitimate alternative to the EU/US approach for the Global South.
Strengths: Enables rapid state-directed AI scaling; large domestic market for experimentation
Weaknesses: Lacks international trust; privacy and human rights concerns; innovation limited by content restrictions
Global influence: Growing rapidly, especially in Belt and Road Initiative countries
The 2026 Governance Landscape: Key Developments
The United Nations Enters the Arena
2026 marks the first year that AI governance has a genuine multilateral, UN-backed forum: the Global Dialogue on AI Governance, which convened with participation from 140+ countries, alongside the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI — modeled partly on the IPCC for climate science.
These bodies don’t have enforcement power. But they are establishing the shared vocabulary and factual foundation for international AI norms — a critical precursor to binding agreements.
The G7 (hosted by the US in 2026) and G20 have both established AI governance working groups. India’s AI Impact Summit brought the perspective of the world’s most populous democracy to global AI debates.
The Oxford Government AI Readiness Index 2025
The Oxford Insights Government AI Readiness Index — which measures countries’ readiness to implement AI in public services — showed striking movements:
| Country | 2025 Rank | Key Strength |
|---|---|---|
| United States | 1 | Technology, infrastructure |
| Singapore | 2 | Policy, governance, infrastructure |
| United Kingdom | 3 | Policy, human capital |
| Finland | 4 | Data availability, human capital |
| Canada | 5 | Human capital, infrastructure |
| China | 6 (up from 23) | Technology, ecosystem |
| South Korea | 7 | Technology, infrastructure |
| Germany | 8 | Infrastructure, human capital |
| France | 9 | Policy, infrastructure |
| Japan | 10 | Technology, infrastructure |
China’s extraordinary jump from 23rd to 6th reflects the massive state investment in AI infrastructure and the maturation of its domestic AI ecosystem.
Middle Powers: Choosing Sides or Staying Neutral?
For countries that are not AI superpowers, the governance race creates a difficult strategic choice: align with the US/EU approach, accept Chinese AI technology with Chinese governance norms attached, or attempt to develop sovereign AI strategies.
The Chatham House analysis of February 2026 identified four strategies available to middle powers:
- Specialization: Develop specific capabilities in one part of the AI supply chain (talent, data, applications, hardware)
- Alignment: Formally align with one of the two dominant blocs and gain access to their AI ecosystems
- Pooled sovereignty: Partner with other middle powers to amplify collective influence
- Hedging: Deliberately use capabilities from multiple blocs to avoid dependence
Countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, India, South Korea, and Brazil are all navigating this terrain. Saudi Arabia’s $100B “Humain” AI initiative and UAE’s investment in building domestic GPU infrastructure reflect a desire to have genuine sovereign AI capability rather than pure dependence.
The Standards War: Where Governance Is Really Being Decided
Beyond high-profile legislation, the real governance battle is happening in technical standards bodies that most people have never heard of:
ISO/IEC: International standards for AI risk management (ISO 42001, ISO 23894) are being adopted by enterprises globally as compliance frameworks
IEEE: Standards for ethical AI design, transparency, and explainability
ITU: The UN’s telecom and technology standards body, where China and the US compete to define AI technical norms
NIST (US): The AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF) is being used globally as a practical governance toolkit — despite having no binding force
ETSI (Europe): European telecommunications standards that increasingly include AI system requirements
The US AI Action Plan explicitly prioritizes winning in these bodies, calling for “vigorous” advocacy against China’s influence. China, for its part, has been systematically building influence by training technical experts from developing countries who then participate in standards votes.
AI Safety: The Bletchley Legacy in 2026
The November 2023 AI Safety Summit at Bletchley Park produced the Bletchley Declaration — signed by 28 countries including the US, UK, EU, China, and India — acknowledging that frontier AI poses “potentially catastrophic” risks and committing to cooperative safety evaluation.
In 2026, the AI Safety ecosystem that grew from Bletchley includes:
- UK AI Safety Institute (AISI): Conducts evaluations of frontier models before release; has evaluated GPT-4o, Claude 3, Gemini Advanced
- US AI Safety Institute (NIST AISI): Established under Biden; status under Trump administration uncertain but operationally continues
- International Network of AI Safety Institutes: Coordinating evaluations across UK, US, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea
The fundamental question these institutes are trying to answer: “How capable are the most advanced AI systems? And what capabilities might emerge that we haven’t anticipated?” The answers shape governance decisions at every level.
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The Geopolitical Stakes: Why This Is Not Just Policy Wonkery
The outcomes of the AI governance race have profound geopolitical implications:
Economic dominance: Countries and companies that set the rules of AI capture the economic rents from global AI deployment
Military application: AI-enabled autonomous weapons, intelligence analysis, cyber operations, and logistics create new military advantages and new risks
Information control: AI-powered disinformation at scale is already reshaping elections and public discourse; governance frameworks determine who can deploy these tools and under what rules
Regulatory export: The EU’s GDPR became a global privacy standard through regulatory export. The EU AI Act may do the same for AI governance — making EU standards the de facto global standard for any company that wants access to the EU market
Norm setting: What is defined as “unsafe” AI today shapes research directions tomorrow; the countries setting safety norms shape what AI gets built
Talent and data: AI governance affects where AI researchers choose to work and what data can be used for training — directly impacting who can build the most capable systems
The Risk of Governance Fragmentation
The most dangerous scenario for the global AI ecosystem is not one bad governance framework — it’s the absence of any coherent global framework. Regulatory fragmentation — different rules in every major jurisdiction — creates:
- Compliance costs that only large incumbents can absorb
- Regulatory arbitrage opportunities that drive development to least-regulated jurisdictions
- Inconsistent safety standards that allow dangerous systems to be deployed somewhere
- Geopolitical friction as AI systems become vectors for political competition
The UN Global Dialogue on AI Governance is attempting to create the diplomatic infrastructure for eventual convergence — but meaningful binding international agreements on AI remain years away at minimum.
Looking Ahead: What 2026-2028 Will Decide
Several pivotal decisions will shape the next phase of global AI governance:
- EU AI Act enforcement: The first major fines under the Act will signal how aggressive the EU is prepared to be — and catalyze compliance globally
- WAICO: Whether China’s proposed global AI governance body gains traction, especially among Global South countries
- US-EU alignment: Whether the US and EU can coordinate enough to present a unified democratic approach to AI governance, or whether their differences fragment the Western position
- International AI safety agreement: Whether the informal Bletchley process evolves toward binding commitments on frontier model evaluation and deployment
- National AI strategies: Whether middle powers develop genuine sovereign AI capabilities or become primarily recipients of technology governed by others’ rules
Conclusion
The AI governance race is not a subplot of geopolitics — it is increasingly the main event. The decisions being made now about who regulates AI, what is permitted, what is banned, and whose values are encoded into AI systems will shape the technological and political landscape for decades.
For tech professionals, understanding the governance environment in which AI is developed and deployed is no longer optional. It shapes which products can be built, in which markets, by which teams. It shapes career opportunities, legal risk, and ethical responsibility.
For citizens of every country, it shapes the AI systems that will increasingly affect jobs, healthcare, education, policing, and public services.
The machines don’t govern themselves. The question is who governs them — and on whose behalf.
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Decision Radar (Algeria Lens)
| Dimension | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Relevance for Algeria | High — Algeria has no national AI governance framework yet and risks becoming a passive recipient of rules set by the US, EU, or China. The country’s growing Huawei/ZTE telecom infrastructure and EU trade ties mean governance choices from both blocs directly affect Algerian tech adoption. |
| Infrastructure Ready? | Partial — CERIST provides research backbone and Algeria Telecom is expanding fiber, but there is no national AI safety institute, no AI risk management framework, and limited compute infrastructure for frontier model evaluation. |
| Skills Available? | Partial — Algeria produces strong mathematics and computer science graduates (ESI, USTHB, University of Tlemcen), but AI policy and governance expertise is extremely thin. There are few professionals trained in AI ethics, standards compliance, or regulatory design. |
| Action Timeline | 6-12 months — Algeria’s Ministry of Digital Economy and Startups should begin drafting a national AI strategy that positions the country before global governance norms crystallize. Waiting beyond 2027 risks locking Algeria into frameworks it had no role in shaping. |
| Key Stakeholders | Ministry of Digital Economy and Startups, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for multilateral engagement at UN AI forums), ANSSI (cybersecurity implications of AI governance), CERIST (technical standards participation), Sonatrach and Sonelgaz (as major AI adopters in energy), Djezzy and Mobilis (telecom infrastructure governed by ITU AI standards), ESI and USTHB (building governance research capacity) |
| Decision Type | Strategic — This is a foundational positioning decision. Algeria must decide whether to align with EU norms (natural fit given geographic and trade proximity), hedge across blocs, or pursue pooled sovereignty with African Union and Arab League partners. |
Quick Take: Algeria is conspicuously absent from global AI governance forums at a moment when the rules are being written. The Ministry of Digital Economy should prioritize sending technical delegates to ISO/IEC and ITU AI standards working groups, and CERIST should begin building AI governance research capacity. Algeria’s position between EU regulatory influence and growing Chinese tech infrastructure presence makes the “hedging” strategy identified by Chatham House the most realistic path — but it requires active policy engagement, not passive waiting.
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